Conventional Wisdom

To call something a conspiracy theory automatically assumes that it is intellectually suspect or should not be believed. The title is synonymous with a story that should be taken with a grain of salt, that should be fact-checked, and that should have substantial evidence before ever being seen as rational. Our immediate discreditation of conspiracy theory is what Charles Pigden refers to as conventional wisdom; through exploring conventional wisdom, as well as interpreting the term “conspiracy theory”, Pigden comes to the conclusion that this conventional wisdom is, in fact, not wise at all.

Pigden begins with stating that, “the conventional wisdom on conspiracy theories is that they ought not to be believed.” Conspiracy theories are things of fiction. They’re false and are seen as silly and incredibly unbelievable. Conspiracy theories were also used as ploys on the parts of politicians in order to dismiss critical allegations –– an allegation comes up, and politicians are quick to throw the term “conspiracy theory” when describing or speaking of them. This tactic relies on the epistemic principle that in general, conspiracy theories ought not to be believed, or that it is irrational to believe them. Therefore, conventional wisdom seems to grant us an epistemic duty to not believe in conspiracy theories. However, Pigden argues that we are rationally entitled to believe in conspiracy theories if that is what evidence suggests; some conspiracy theories are not epistemologically unsound, and it is “often permissible – even obligatory – to believe them.” We cannot be obliged not to believe conspiracy theories unless we have epistemic obligations.

Pigden then introduces the Ought-Implies-Can principle, then combines it with the idea that belief is not voluntary: we cannot decide what to believe or disbelieve, and when faced with certain considerations, we are moved by evidence to one way or the other. For example, if one cannot help but believe that the Bust family were responsible for the destruction of the Twin Towers, then it is pointless to say that they ought to not believe it as they are incapable of disbelieving that the Bust family was responsible. Therefore, the idea of epistemic ethic is fundamentally “cock-eyed, since it presumes (wrongly) that we can control our beliefs.” Furthermore, he goes on to disprove the Ought-Implies-Can principle, stating that it is not a logical thesis but a plausible ethical principle that holds in some systems of ethics, but not others. It is not clear that it has to be incorporated into a plausible ethics of belief, and though one cannot bring themselves to believe anything, it seems as if one can decide what to challenge one’s belief in.

Epistemic “oughts” are also discussed. Pigden states that he is inclined to believe that these “oughts” are to achieve a widely shared optional end, such as achieving understanding of the world. Then, he says that “the claim that we rationally ought to adopt a belief-forming strategy… would appear to presuppose that the strategy in question is conductive to truth and the avoidance of error…” Thus, we adopt these strategies, such as not believing in or not questioning conspiracy theories, due to wanting to avoid being wrong, and wanting to look towards something that is more truthful. It lays on the assumption that conspiracy theories are unlikely to be true, so they are generally not worth discussing. However, this assumption is not strong enough to cease theorizing altogether, nor does the fact that theories in general are more likely to be false than true.

Pidgen makes another point in dispute of conventional wisdom: if a conspiracy theory is simply a theory that posits a secret plan on the part of some group in order to influence events in secret, then the conventional wisdom is absurd. Pigden states that a theory “is a more or less organized body of propositions designed to explain some alleged facts.” Theories can be true or false, well or badly confirmed, and if they are well-confirmed enough, they can be considered as knowledge. Thus, to call something a theory is not to imply that it is speculative or unproven, and if conspiracy theories are simply theories that posit a conspiracy, then every political and historical person is a conspiracy theorist, since “every such person subscribes to a vast range of conspiracy theories.” In other words, historically literate people believe organized bodies of propositions that explain alleged facts by positing conspiracy theories. Furthermore, Pigden raises the fact that “it is difficult, if not impossible, to mount a coup without conspiring.” When taking history into account, one must consider that the assassinations of historical figures were planned in secret, thus anyone who knows anything about the Ides of March, or even the assassination of Kennedy, must be some conspiracy theorist. In the same vein, disappearances are also conspiratorial, so the knowledge of these events makes the person who knows about them a conspiracy theorist.

There are three conclusions with this:

  1. If conspiracy theories are theories that posit conspiracies, then the epistemic principle that conspiracy theories ought to not be believed or investigated is absurd. As critical allegations are often dismissed as conspiracy theories, to simply discard them is not intelligently respectable, despite conventional wisdom.
  2. History, ask known from both documentary evidence and historians, is made of conspiracies. Thus, if conspiracy theories are theories that posit conspiracies, then to accept conventional wisdom would lead to the conclusion that history is false, and much of what we thought we knew is unbelievable, as well as not worth investigating. Much of recorded history contains conspiracy theories, or unexplainable events, so are we just to throw these out the window? Thus, it is not rational to suppose that we should not believe or even investigate conspiracy theories.
  3. Most political crimes, such as disappearances and illegal bombing campaigns are the products of conspiracy. Thus, if conspiracy theories are theories that posit conspiracies, then to accept conventional wisdom, we would not hold anyone accountable for these crimes. To hold people accountable would be to play into the conspiracy theory, and even investigate it. We could not punish people for crimes that we are not entitled to believe in or investigate, which is politically and epistemically irrational. Therefore, this conventional wisdom is irrational.

With these conclusions, it is possible to see how conventional wisdom, although appealing upon first glance, is irrational when it comes to the application of conspiracy theories. With the use of conventional wisdom, we are willfully ignoring certain things such as critical allegations, as well as crimes that people can be held responsible for. Thus, conventional wisdom allows an epistemically and politically irresponsible response to conspiracy theories. That being said, Pidgen states that it is our rational and epistemic duty to investigate, as well as believe in these conspiracy theories, instead of simply assuming that they are intellectually suspect and not worthy of being believed.

Personally, I believe that Pigden is correct. To state that a conspiracy theory is simply unfounded because of its' title as "conspiracy theory" runs the risk of losing potentially important information, all because one did not want to believe in it. It also plays into political ploys, and makes it easier for things such as war criminals to exist, as well as allows for the scapegoating of groups in lieu of believing a conspiracy theory.

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